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THE TAX BENEFIT RULE AFTER HILLSBORO
In both its original and most recent form, the tax benefit rule has been a popular
subject of praise, criticism and debate. This Note, however, which focuses on the
latest version of the rule, provides a unique and insightful analysis of the Supreme
Court's opinions in the companion cases Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy
which were decided in 1984. Unlike the traditional formulation of the rule which
required the realization of income only upon the actual recovery of a previously taken
deduction, the Court's new rule depends on the occurrence of a 'fundamentally in-
consistent event." This author finds difficulties with the application of this new tax
benefit rule to both the facts in Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy as well as to
fact situations which are likely to arise in the future. He concludes that a narrowing
of the rule is necessary in order to ensure consistent treatment of taxpayers and con-
sistent results.
INTRODUCTION
THE TAX BENEFIT RULE is a judicially-created' attempt to
redress certain inequities which would arise ili a tax system
which strictly adheres to an annual accounting method.2 First rec-
ognized in 1929, 3 the rule has gone through periods of acceptance,
rejection, and modification.4 Basically, the tax benefit rule requires
a taxpayer to recognize income in the year in which an event occurs
which is fundamentally inconsistent with the taking of a deduction
in a prior year. The Supreme Court formulated this latest version
of the rule in the companion cases Hillsboro National Bank v. Com-
missioner and Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner.5 The Hillsboro ver-
1. Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265, 267 (1978).
2. Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv.
1257, 1257 (1984).
3. Excelsior Printing v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929). The rule was first dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). Although
the Court declined to adopt "any rule of tax benefits," Dobson, 320 U.S. at 509, the decision
was the first to recognize the inequity of treating the recovery of a prior loss as taxable in-
come when that prior loss conferred no tax benefit upon the taxpayer. Dobson, 320 U.S. at
506.
4. For a discussion of the history of the tax benefit rule, see Bittker & Kanner, supra
note 1, at 265-67; Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations and Annual Ac-
counting: A Cure For the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995, 999-1010 (1968). For de-
tailed discussions of the rule's early development, see Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today,
57 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130-34 (1943); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAX. L.
REv. 329, 329-30 (1948). See also Elliott, The Tax Benefit Rule: A Common Law of Recap-
ture, 39 Sw. L.J. 845 (1985); Nichols, The Tax Benefit Rule: Clarification or Confusion after
Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, 30 U. CALIF. SCH. L. TAX INST. 12 (1984).
5. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). Both cases are cited under the Hillsboro title. For purposes of
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sion of the tax benefit rule6 represents the Supreme Court's
acceptance of a significant change in the formulation of the rule.
Prior to Hillsboro, the traditional and most common formulation of
the rule was that when there was recovery by a taxpayer of an item
he deducted in an earlier year, the taxpayer must recognize income
to the extent that the prior deduction gave him a tax benefit.7
In addition to this "inclusionary" aspect of the rule, the tax ben-
efit rule also has an "exclusionary" side, from which it derives its
name.' According to the exclusionary tax benefit rule, income is
only recognized upon the happening of a fundamentally inconsis-
tent event (or a recovery) to the extent that the taxpayer received a
tax benefit from the earlier deduction.9 For example, suppose a tax-
payer pays state taxes but cannot deduct them on his federal tax
return because he takes the zero bracket amount deduction. Any
subsequent refund of the state tax to the taxpayer is therefore not
taxable income because no tax benefit was derived from the earlier
deduction. 10 While this Note will focus primarily on the inclusion-
ary aspect of the tax benefit rule, exploration of the rule's underly-
ing rationales require an appreciation of its exclusionary side as
well.
The purpose of this Note is to shed some light on the application
of the tax benefit rule after Hillsboro. To do this, the Note will
examine the evolution of the tax benefit rule, noting how the test
this Note, the opinion of the case will hereinafter be referred to as Hillsboro. When discuss-
ing the facts of each particular case, however, Bliss and Hillsboro will be used accordingly.
6. Justice O'Connor, who wrote for the majority, stated: "[Tihe tax benefit rule will
.cancel out' an earlier deduction [i.e., require income to be recognized in the current tax year]
only when a careful examination shows that the later event is indeed fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based." Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383.
7. The most notable case upholding this "recovery" theory was a Ninth Circuit opin-
ion. See Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). See also
Note, Formulation and Application of the Tax Benefit Rule: Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner, 37 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1013-15 (1984); Comment, supra note 2, at 1261-64. See
infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
8. Congress codified the exclusionary component of the tax benefit rule in section 111
of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). I.R.C. § I 1 l(a) (1980) provides: "Gross income
does not include income attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount
deducted in any prior taxable year to the extent such amount did not reduce income subject
to tax." Subsequently issued Treasury Regulations and court decisions have noted its inclu-
sionary aspect as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489,
505-06 (1943). See Note, The Tax Benefit Rule - A Judicially Broadened Tool For Transac-
tional Tax Equity, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (1984); Note, supra note 7, at 1012. See also
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1, at 272-81.
9. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1, at 276-81.
10. Id.
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has developed to its present formulation. 1 A brief discussion of the
rationales underlying the tax benefit rule and how they apply to the
various formulations of the rule will follow.' 2 The Note will then
analyze and critique the Supreme Court's application of its new test
to the Hillsboro and Bliss facts.I3 Next, the Note will apply the new
test to fact patterns in which the tax benefit problem may arise in
the future.14 Finally, this Note concludes that some narrowing of
the tax benefit rule is necessary to ensure its consistent application
and suggests how that narrowing should take place.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
The specific history of the tax benefit rule has been exhaustively
explored elsewhere. 5 This discussion will therefore only generally
trace that evolution. Throughout its history, the most difficult task
associated with the tax benefit rule has been to determine what type
of occurrence triggers the rule. Indeed, it was this issue that
sparked the intense disagreement between Justice O'Connor and
Justice Stevens in Hillsboro.6
A. The Recovery Requirement
Throughout its first fifty or so years the tax benefit rule forced
taxpayers to recognize income on the recovery of an earlier year's
deduction. 7 For instance, assume a taxpayer wrote off a bad debt
in year One and made an appropriate deduction of the amount. 8
That deduction provides him with a tax benefit, i.e., it reduces his
taxable income. In year Two (or any subsequent year),' 9 if the
debtor pays off the debt, the taxpayer would have "recovered" the
11. See infra notes 15-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1; Plumb, supra note 4; Comment, supra note
2, at 1258-61.
16. For a critical discussion of the propriety of the argumentative opinions of Justices
O'Connor and Stevens, see Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Tax Controver-
sies-Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAXES 363 (1983); Note, supra note
7, at 1020-21.
17. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1, at 265.
18. Section 166 of the Code allows for the deduction of bad debts.
19. The statute of limitations is no bar to the application of the tax benefit rule. It is this
aspect of the rule that is particularly troublesome to Justice Stevens under the majority's
formulation of the rule in Hillsboro: "[The new formulation] will enlarge the tax gatherer's
discretionary power" to reexamine past transactions. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 37:362
TAX BENEFIT RULE
previous deduction and as such would have to recognize income to
the extent of the lesser of 1) the amount of the recovery or 2) the
amount by which the previous deduction reduced his taxable
income.20
This example is a simple case in which there is no doubt that a
recovery has occurred. The taxpayer has in fact not lost something
(the amount of the debt) that he had previously told the govern-
ment he had lost. Note that normally the repayment of a debt is not
an income realization event.21 qn the context of a previous deduc-
tion, however, at least intuitively it seems fair that the taxpayer
should have to make amends for his previous error. Several ratio-
nales support this intuition.22 It can be noted now that the recovery
requirement rests somewhat on the notion that the taxpayer's recov-
ery is, in and of itself, a realization event, i.e., it is no longer a return
of capital but rather it represents an increase in the taxpayer's
income.
B. The Inconsistent Events Theory
Although the inconsistent events theory first appeared in Estate
of Block v. Commissioner,23 the more complete exposition of the
theory is found in Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Com-
missioner.24 While paying lip service to the recovery requirement,
the Tennessee-Carolina court adopted the view that "[t]he rule
should apply whenever there is an actual recovery of a previously
deducted amount or when there is some other event inconsistent
with that prior deduction."25 In January, 1967, the taxpayer, Ten-
nessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc., (Tennessee-Carolina) pur-
20. The tax benefit rule does not account for differences in marginal tax rates between
the years in question. Therefore, the amount of tax saved in the year of deduction will proba-
bly differ from the amount of the tax increase in the year of the inconsistent event and income
recognition. See, eg., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (previous deductions recovered as income were taxed at the tax rate in effect during the
year of realization rather than at the tax rate during the year of deduction).
21. Normally the repayment of capital, e.g., repayment of loan principal, is not income
to the recipient. Similarly, in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), the Court
held that proceeds received from a conversion of capital assets were not to be regarded as
income. Id. at 184.
22. See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1, at 267-72.
23. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d
60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
24. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
25. Id. at 382. The court undercut its argument, however, noting that even if recovery
was required, a fictional recovery could be found by virtue of the fact that the tires and tubes,
supposedly used up, existed at liquidation. The "reappearance" of the tires and tubes was
therefore sufficient recovery to invoke the rule. Id.
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chased all of the capital stock of Service Lines, Inc. (Service). Both
companies were engaged in the trucking industry. On March 1,
1967, Service was liquidated and merged into Tennessee-Carolina,
at which time Service transferred all of its assets to Tennessee-Caro-
lina in exchange for Service's own stock, which was then retired.26
One of the assets transferred to Tennessee-Carolina was an in-
ventory of truck tires and tubes which Service had properly ex-
pensed. Pursuant to section 334(b)(2) of the 1954 Code,27
Tennessee-Carolina allocated a portion of the purchase price of the
Service stock to this inventory thereby acquiring a stepped-up basis
in the inventory. Tennessee-Carolina then deducted this basis as a
business expense on the consolidated tax return it filed for itself and
Service in 1967.28
The Commissioner argued that under the tax benefit rule, Ser-
vice should be required to recognize as income on its 1967 return an
amount equal to the previously expensed but unused tires and
tubes.29 Service argued that the rule should not apply since Service
itself had never recovered the previous deduction.3 °
The Sixth Circuit held that a recovery requirement "asserts a
wooden interpretation of the tax benefit rule which we find inappro-
priate. ' 31 Instead, the court endorsed the inconsistent events test
stating that the tax benefit rule "should apply whenever there is an
actual recovery of a previously deducted amount or when there is
some other event inconsistent with that prior deduction. ' '32 The
court concluded that "the transfer to [Tennessee-Carolina] with a
stepped-up basis ... of the tires and tubes which had a substantial
useful life remaining was inconsistent with the prior expensing of
them."33 This inconsistency was sufficient for the Sixth Circuit to
invoke the tax benefit rule.
34
26. Id. at 379-80.
27. Section 334(b)(2) of the 1954 Code was amended by § 224(b) of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Its step-up basis principle, however, remains intact in
§ 338 of the present Code.
28. Tennessee-Carolina, 582 F.2d at 380.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 382.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Sixth Circuit was joined by the Seventh Circuit in endorsing the inconsis-
tent events approach. See First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614
F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980) (although the Seventh Circuit noted that a recovery test
would also have been met under the facts).
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C. The Fundamentally Inconsistent Events Test
Certiorari was granted in the Hillsboro cases to settle the conflict
among the circuits as to which test to apply under the tax benefit
rule.35 Interestingly though, the Supreme Court did not adhere to
any of the previous formulations of the rule nor to any theory ar-
gued by the parties.3 6 Instead, it created the fundamentally incon-
sistent events test.37 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority and
formulated the new test based on the premise that the tax benefit
rule should "allay some of the inflexibilities of the annual account-
ing system."38 To achieve this purpose, the Court rejected the re-
covery requirement as being too narrow since there existed
situations in which the tax benefit rule should apply where there
was no actual recovery. 9 Justice O'Connor stated that a recovery
requirement "would introduce an undesirable formalism into the
application of the tax benefit rule [and] ... would, in many cases,
simply require the Government to cast its argument in different and
unnatural terminology, without adding anything to the analysis."4
Instead of expanding the meaning of recovery to cover cases like
Tennessee-Carolina, the Court chose to formulate a new test.41
The Court did not, however, endorse the inconsistent events test
of Tennessee-Carolina. Justice O'Connor thought this test was too
broad in that it triggered the tax benefit rule in situations where the
rule should not apply. She argued that "[n]ot every unforeseen
event will require the taxpayer to report income in the amount of
his earlier deduction."'42 Thus, Justice O'Connor sought to distin-
guish the merely inconsistent from the fundamentally inconsistent
stating that the tax benefit rule would apply only upon the occur-
rence of an event which is "fundamentally inconsistent with the
premise on which the [prior] deduction was initially based."43
Of course, essential to Justice O'Connor's analysis is a method
to determine what constitutes a fundamentally inconsistent event.
35. 457 U.S. 1103 (1982).
36. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381. Justice Stevens found that "[the new test] obviously
differs from both the Government's 'inconsistent event' theory and the familiar 'recovery'
theory .... Id. at 418. See also Note, supra note 8, at 1380.
37. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381.
38. Id. at 377; see also Bittker & Kanner, supra note 1, at 284; Note, supra note 8, at
1380.
39. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381.
40. Id. at 382-83.
41. Id. at 382.
42. Id. at 383.
43. Id.
1986]
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She tried to provide some help by stating that "only if the occur-
rence of the event in the earlier year would have resulted in the
disallowance of the deduction can the Commissioner require a com-
pensating recognition of income when the event occurs in the later
year."'  The usefulness of this attempted definition for fundamen-
tally inconsistent events is limited, however, since it may raise as
many questions as it solves."
After her discussion of what triggers the tax benefit rule, Justice
O'Connor adds a second tier to the analysis to cover those situa-
tions in which the later event occurs in the context of a nonrecogni-
tion provision.46 When application of the tax benefit rule conflicts
with some rule of nonrecognition, this second analytical tier com-
pels the Court (and presumably taxpayers) to balance the policy
underlying the nonrecognition provision against the policy support-
ing the tax benefit rule in order to determine whether the nonrecog-
nition provision prevents the application of the tax benefit rule.47
Since the focus of this Note is on the determination of what type of
event signals application of the tax benefit rule, the nonrecognition
portion of the analysis will not be examined further.
II. RATIONALES BEHIND THE DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS OF
THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
The divergence of views on the proper formulation of the tax
benefit rule is not simply a matter of persons disagreeing on how to
best reach a common goal.48 An example of this divergence is am-
ply reflected in Hillsboro. Justice O'Connor wrote for a five-justice
majority which voted to reverse both cases based on the new funda-
mentally inconsistent events test.49 Justice Brennan concurred in
44. Id. at 388-89.
45. For a discussion of the vagueness of this aspect of Justice O'Connor's test, see Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 1270-76 (unclear whether the definition is an exclusive one or merely
an example). The Hillsboro opinion itself manifests the ambiguity of this analysis since Jus-
tice O'Connor's approach is not expressly used in either the Hillsboro or the Bliss fact pat-
terns. White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 486, 493 (1983).
46. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 397. This analysis differs from the Tennessee-Carolina analy-
sis which treated the § 336 liquidation itself as the inconsistent event. Tennessee-Carolina,
582 F.2d at 380-83.
47. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 397-98. Justice O'Connor concluded that the policy underly-
ing § 336 was "to prevent recognition of market appreciation that has not been realized by an
arm's-length transfer ... [and not] to shield all types of income that might arise from the
disposition of an asset." Id. at 398.
48. The differences of opinion focused on the original purpose underlying the rule. Con-
sequently, this disagreement produced different formulations of the rule.
49. Id. at 372-403.
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applying the new test but thought the majority applied it incor-
rectly."0 Justices Stevens and Marshall rejected the fundamentally
inconsistent events test and applied a recovery test.5 1 The recovery
test yielded a concurrence with the result from its application to the
Hillsboro facts and a dissent with respect to the facts in Bliss 2.5  Jus-
tice Blackmun dissented in both cases. 3 He disagreed that any tax
benefit rule should apply, arguing instead that at least in cases in
which the statute of limitations had not run, it makes far more sense
to amend the prior return. 4 Alternatively, Justice Blackmun found
that if a fundamentally inconsistent events rule is applied, the ma-
jority's application of the rule was erroneous under the Hillsboro
facts. 55
This disparity of opinion generates the question of whether all
the members of the Court have the same rule in mind. The answer
is that they do not. Since each of three Justices attacks the tax ben-
efit rule with a different goal in mind, each disagrees on the solu-
tions to the cases.56 Justice Blackmun's argument suggests that
returns should be amendable at any time prior to the running of the
statute of limitations.57 In essence, he is suggesting a multi-annual
accounting period. It is questionable whether Justice Blackmun
would suggest an overturning of the Sanford & Brooks doctrine,58
that doctrine having been engrained into the present tax system.59
But Justice Blackmun at least suggests that the annual accounting
requirement should be significantly relaxed: "I am troubled, how-
ever, by the tendency to carry out the second concern (the integrity
of the annual return) to unnecessary and undesirable limits. The
50. Ia at 403.
51. Id. at 403-22.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 422-27.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 422.
56. These differences can be traced to the respective deference (or lack thereof) that the
Justices pay to the notion that transactional accounting is a more equitable arrangement than
annual accounting and, therefore, that annual accounting should give way wherever
practicable.
57. The statute of limitations for amending a federal tax return is three years. I.R.C.
§ 6511 (a) (1954).
58. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). The Supreme Court endorsed
the annual accounting system for tax purposes on the grounds of practical and administrative
necessity.
59. Section 441(a) of the present Code, entitled "Period for Computation of Taxable
Income," provides that "[tiaxable income shall be computed on the basis of the taxpayer's
taxable year." I.R.C. § 441(a) (West Supp. 1986).
1986]
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rule is not that sacrosanct." 60
Justice O'Connor takes the middle ground on this continuum of
deference to transactional accounting. Rather than completely dis-
pensing with annual accounting, as Justice Blackmun would in
many cases, 61 she would use the tax benefit rule to maintain the
integrity of the annual accounting system while correcting what she
sees as one of its major deficiencies. 62 Justice O'Connor saw an un-
fairness in allowing a taxpayer to reap a tax benefit that, if all facts
had been known at the time of the earlier deduction, should have
been disallowed. The unfairness derives from the fact that other
similarly situated taxpayers, for whom the "deduction" and the in-
consistent event occurred in the same year, would be forced to pay
more in taxes than a taxpayer whose deduction and inconsistent
event straddled two years. This fact pattern from a comment on the
tax benefit rule may be instructive.63 Assume taxpayer A writes off
and deducts a bad debt as a loss in year One. Assume also that in
year Two the debtor pays off the debt. Without the tax benefit rule,
A would have received the benefit of the deduction and could keep
it, since it was valid at the time. In year Two no income would be
recognized since returns of capital are not income producing
events. 64 However, taxpayer B, who writes off a bad debt in year
One and subsequently but unexpectedly receives repayment in year
One, is precluded from taking any deduction. All other factors be-
ing equal, taxpayer A pays less tax than taxpayer B.6 5 It is from this
concern that Justice O'Connor apparently derives her same year
test for fundamental inconsistency: "if the event had occurred
within the same taxable year, it would have foreclosed the
deduction." 66
Justice Stevens' position is at the other end of the spectrum, op-
posite that of Justice Blackmun.67 Justice Stevens acknowledges the
annual accounting requirement as fundamental to the tax system
and totally rejects the notion that the purpose of the tax benefit rule
60. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 424.
61. Justice Blackmun does not say at what point he would choose a tax benefit rule over
opening up a previous year's return. He argues, however, that at least in fact patterns like
those found in Hillsboro and Bliss, where the inconsistent event occurs shortly after the close
of the tax year, common sense would counsel amendment. Id. at 427.
62. Id. at 403-22.
63. Comment, supra note 2, at 1259-61.
64. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 377.
66. Id. at 383-84.
67. Id. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is to effect transactional accounting.68 He believes the purpose of
the rule is "to determine the character of a current wealth-enhanc-
ing event, when viewed in light of past deductions ... .,,69 To Jus-
tice Stevens, the majority's new formulation "constitutes an
extremely significant enlargement of the tax collector's powers,"70
because it allows the government to determine the propriety of an
earlier deduction in light of events in subsequent years. The tax-
payer, on the other hand, has no power to amend returns beyond
the three year statute of limitations.71 According to Stevens, the
majority's formulation of the rule is a grant of power to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) without any corresponding grant to the tax-
payer.7" Note that in virtually all situations in which the tax benefit
rule can be invoked, it is the government which will reap the
benefits.73
The principle on which Stevens' position on the tax benefit rule
is based, namely, that income is to be taxed in the year it is received,
is a pervasive one in the area of taxation. For Justice Stevens, the
tax benefit rule makes sense only When it works to tax income re-
ceived and not to disqualify an earlier deduction. This, in turn, re-
quires that there be a recovery in order to recognize income-a
recovery which entails some increase to the net worth of the tax-
payer in the present tax year. In contrast, O'Connor's approach is
aimed at recognizing in the present tax year income that should
have been recognized in an earlier tax year.74
III. APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALLY INCONSISTENT
EVENTS TEST TO HILLSBORO AND BLISS
Building upon the previous discussion of the evolution and ra-
tionales of the tax benefit rule, a critical examination of the
Supreme Court's application of the rule in the Hillsboro and Bliss
cases follows. Such an examination is necessary to understand the
68. Id.
69. Id. at 404.
70. Id. Previously the tax collector's powers to determine a deduction were limited to
performance of an audit of that year's return. Justice Stevens objected to the government
being able to scrutinize deductions with the aid of hindsight. Id. at n.2.
71. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1954).
72. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 404.
73. The only situation where this will not be so is where the previous deduction did not
decrease the taxpayer's taxable income. This is the exclusionary side of the rule. See supra
notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
74. For an analytical discussion of the concept of recognizing a prior year's income in
the present tax year, see White, supra note 45.
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cases' precedential value, and provides the basis for predicting the
rule's future applications.
A. The Facts of Hillsboro
In Hillsboro, the taxpayer, Hillsboro National Bank (the Bank)
was an incorporated bank operating in Illinois.75 Until 1970, Illi-
nois imposed a property tax on shares of stock held in such banks.76
The banks customarily paid these taxes for their shareholders."
The banks were allowed a deduction for the taxes paid under sec-
tion 164(e) of the Code, and the shareholders were not allowed any
deduction for these taxes.78 In 1970, Illinois amended its constitu-
tion to prohibit ad valorem 79 taxation on personal property. 0
While the constitutionality of the amendment was being litigated in
the state courts and the Supreme Court, the Bank paid the disputed
taxes for 1972 into a state escrow account. 8 When the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the state amendment, 82 the
state treasury refunded the taxes directly to the shareholders in
1973 (with accrued interest). The Bank recognized no income from
this sequence of events on its 1973 federal income tax return. The
Commissioner charged the Bank with a deficiency in the amount of
the payments made from the escrow to its shareholders.8 3 The Tax
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination,84 and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision.8
B. The Facts of Bliss
In Bliss, the taxpayer, Bliss Dairy, Inc., (the Dairy), was a
75. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 372.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 372-73.
78. Section 164(e) of the Code provides that a corporation may deduct, and a share-
holder may not deduct, state taxes "[w]here a corporation pays a tax imposed on a share-
holder on his interest as a shareholder, and where the shareholder does not reimburse the
corporation .... " I.R.C. § 164(e) (1982).
79. Ad valorem taxation is taxation imposed by states on the value of property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979).
80. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 §§ 557-58 (1971) (repealed
1981, eft. Dec. 31, 1982).
81. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373.
82. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
83. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373-74.
84. The Tax Court ruled that the refund of taxes to the Bank's shareholders triggered
the tax benefit rule. However, payments to the shareholders of the accrued interest on the
refunds did not. Therefore, the Bank had to recognize income only to the extent of the
refunds, not the interest. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61, 67-68 (1979).
85. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
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closely held corporation engaged in the dairy business. 86 As a cash
basis taxpayer, it deducted the cost of certain cattle feed it
purchased during its tax year ending June 30, 1973.1' The deduc-
tion was proper under section 162 of the Code as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. 8 On the second day of its next tax
year, the Dairy adopted a plan of liquidation under which the Dairy
distributed its assets, including a significant amount of the cattle
feed, to its shareholders.89 Relying on section 336, the Dairy recog-
nized no income on the liquidation.90 The shareholders continued
to operate the business in noncorporate form and filed an election
under section 33391 to limit the gain recognized by them and calcu-
lated their basis in the assets received (including the feed) according
to section 334(c).92 Under this section the shareholders had a posi-
tive basis in the unused cattle feed and deducted that basis as a
section 162 business expense for the next fiscal year.93
The Commissioner charged that the Dairy should have recog-
nized income in the year of liquidation in the amount of the value of
the unused cattle feed.94 The Dairy paid the resulting tax and sued
for a refund in the District Court for the District of Arizona. 95 The
district court held in favor of the Dairy96 and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.9 7 Both courts held that since the Dairy did not recover its
previous deduction it need not recognize income on this sequence of
86. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
87. Id.
88. Section 162(a) of the 1982 Code provides for the deduction of "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness ...." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
89. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
90. Id at 374-75. Section 336(a) of the 1976 Code provided that "no gain or loss shall
be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in complete or partial liquida-
tion." I.R.C. § 336(a) (1976).
91. Section 333 of the 1954 Code provided certain elections with respect to gain recogni-
tion in liquidations. It stated the conditions under which shareholders would recognize gain
and the nature of that gain in pursuance of plans of complete one-month liquidations. I.R.C.
§ 333 (1954).
92. Section 334(c) of the 1954 Code states that the basis of property received in ex-
change for stock in such a liquidation equals the shareholder's basis in the stock less any cash
or securities received plus any gain recognized on the liquidation. This basis is then allocated
among the assets received. I.R.C. § 334(c) (1954). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.334-2 (1982).
93. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 376.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981). The court relied on
its formulation of the tax benefit rule in the case of South Lake Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner,
324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). See supra note 7.
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events.98
C. Application of the New Test to Hillsboro
Under the facts of Hillsboro, the majority applied its new test
and found that no fundamentally inconsistent event had occurred
and therefore the tax benefit rule was not triggered.99 The method-
ology in applying the new rule was, however, strained and confus-
ing. It was strained because the majority went to unreasonable
lengths to find no inconsistency based on its "premise" test; it was
confusing because the majority did not apply its alternative state-
ment of the test, the same year test, at all.
In applying its premise test, the majority approached the Hills-
boro facts by focusing on section 164(e) of the Code which permit-
ted the initial deduction for payments of the shareholders' tax
liability by the Bank. °° In essence, the majority noted, this provi-
sion permitted the Bank to make a deductible dividend"' by paying
taxes actually owed by its shareholders. 102 The majority found that
Congress intended to provide relief for corporations making such
payments by permitting the deduction,10 3 and that Congress was
unconcerned whether the payment to the state treasury was used in
any way inconsistent with the payment of a tax. 104 In this way, the
majority found that the refund to the shareholders was not funda-
mentally inconsistent with the taking of the deduction. Thus, Con-
gress' intent to provide relief for corporations making such
payments on behalf of its shareholders was fulfilled.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority emphasized a brief por-
tion of legislative history." 5 The majority cited remarks made by a
Senator during hearings on the then-proposed section 164(e) to sup-
port its reasoning that Congress did not care how the state ulti-
98. Bliss Dairy, 645 F.2d at 20.
99. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 393-95.
100. Section 164(e)(1) of the Code permits the deduction allowed in subsection (1) (relat-
ing to the deduction of certain taxes) to be taken by a corporation where that corporation
pays a tax "imposed on a shareholder on his interest as a shareholder, and where the share-
holder does not reimburse the corporation." I.R.C. § 164(e) (1982). See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
101. Even though "the general structure of the corporate tax provisions does not permit
deduction of dividends ...." Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 391.
102. Section 164(e) of the 1982 Code also denies the deduction of the state tax to the
shareholders. I.R.C. § 164(e)(2) (1982). Therefore, the provision merely reallocates the ben-
efit of the deduction and does not create a new deduction.
103. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394.
104. Id.
105. Id. See Blum, supra note 16, at 364.
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mately used the funds.'0 6 The majority thus reached its result by
determining that the premise for the initial deduction was a pay-
ment to the state treasury rather than a payment of a tax.'0 7 There-
fore, Hillsboro may stand for the proposition that the premise on
which a deduction is based is not necessarily to be garnered from
the plain words of a statute. Rather, a thorough examination of the
legislative history is the key to finding the premise of the deduction.
The majority's fundamentally inconsistent events test is troub-
ling in at least two respects. First, the test provides no guidance as
to when the plain words of the statute must be overlooked in order
to permit the legislative history to determine the premise on which
the deduction is based. Second, even if it is agreed that legislative
history should decide the issue in a particular case, taxpayers, tax
planners, and tax collectors will be unable to agree on a consistent
interpretation of any legislative history. Consequently, the courts
will have to decide these matters. To demonstrate the difficulties
inherent in the test, one need only point to the opinions of Justices
Blackmun and Brennan who agree (at least arguendo in Justice
Blackmun's case) that the fundamentally inconsistent events test is
appropriate, but who disagree with the majority on the result that
the test yields.'0 8
Given the problems with the majority's application of the rule, a
more appropriate application of the new test, at least as it is worded
by the majority, would have been that of Justice Blackmun. Justice
Blackmun discounts the finding of the majority concerning the leg-
islative history and focuses on a much more intuitive notion, de-
rived from the statute itself, that the deduction was meant for the
payment of a tax, and there being no tax imposed, the tax benefit
rule should apply.'" 9 Such an application would have the advan-
106. "'I have been a director in a bank.., for over 20 years. They have paid that tax
ever since I have owned a share of stock in the bank .... I know nothing about it. I do not
take I cent of credit for deductions, and the banks are entitled to it. They pay it out.'"
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Comm. on Finance,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 251 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Smoot)) (emphasis added by the Court).
107. Id. This interpretation of the statute has been severely criticized. Professor Blum
states: "I have yet to discover a connection between the Senator's musings and the majority's
conclusion." Blum, supra note 16, at 364. Blum further contends that "the majority discov-
ered Congressional intention by reading a strained meaning into an off-handed expression by
a single Senator directed to a point not involved in the issues under adjudication by the
Court." Id. This Note tries to explain why the Court strained in its interpretation of this
statute.
108. See supra notes 50, 53-60 and accompanying text.
109. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tage of predictability, a valuable commodity in tax law but one with
which the majority apparently was unconcerned.
The majority never applies its alternative statement of the rule,
the "same year" test, to the Hillsboro facts perhaps because applica-
tion of this test to those facts is circular and inconclusive. Applica-
tion of the premise test under the majority's analysis would require
that had all the events occurred in the same year, the deduction
would have been allowed. Application of the premise test under
Justice Blackmun's approach would have disallowed the deduction
if all events had occurred in the same year. Therefore, the "same
year" inquiry adds nothing to the analysis independent of the basic
premise test.
D. Application of the New Test to Bliss
Under the Bliss facts, the majority again avoids the direct use of
its new test. 110 It sets out what it believes to be the basic premise
for the deduction of the feed, stating that "[t]he deduction is predi-
cated on the consumption of the asset in the trade or business."1"'
The majority does not state explicitly, however, that the liquidation
with expensed feed on hand is fundamentally inconsistent with this
premise. Instead, it focuses on the distinction between section 162,
which allows deductions for ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses and which permitted the initial deduction in Bliss, and sec-
tion 262 which denies deductions for personal expenses. 1 2 The
majority then broadly states that distribution to shareholders in liq-
uidation is analogous to personal consumption 1 3 and that, there-
fore, the tax benefit rule requires the Dairy to take into account as
income the amount of the earlier deduction attributable to the dis-
tributed and unconsumed feed.114
A proper application of the majority's test would be to decide
directly whether liquidation and distribution were fundamentally
inconsistent with "consumption" as used in defining the basic prem-
ise for the deduction. 5 All that is then required is to find an ap-
110. Comment, supra note 2, at 1271.
111. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 395.
112. Id. at 395-96.
113. Id. at 396.
114. Id. at 403. The Court remanded the case for a determination of the proper amount
of the increase in taxable income. Id.
115. It may be worth noting that the principle in General Utilities & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), that a corporation does not recognize income upon distribu-
tion to its shareholders of assets which have appreciated, is eliminated in the 1986 Tax Code.
Hence, gains will be recognized whether the distribution is through a liquidation or not.
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propriate definition of "consumption." The Court cites a regulation
which defines "consumption" to mean "used in operation."
' 16
Clearly, distribution to shareholders could not be construed as a use
in the operation of the business; therefore the two notions are funda-
mentally inconsistent. This straightforward analysis leads to the
same conclusion as the majority but has the advantages of: (1) us-
ing the fundamentally inconsistent events test as stated, and (2)
avoiding the possible theoretical problems of analogizing to per-
sonal consumption before deciding whether a fundamental inconsis-
tency exists.' 
7
IV. FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
The result of Hillsboro is that taxpayers are left to deal with the
fundamentally inconsistent events test in the wide variety of cases
where the tax benefit rule may apply. As discussed above,' 8 the
rule set forth in and applied to the Hillsboro and Bliss facts does not
provide clear guidelines for future application. Considering that
Hillsboro represents only the third time the Supreme Court has con-
sidered a tax benefit problem," 9 it is unlikely that any further clari-
fications will be handed down in the near future. Thus, this part of
the Note will apply the new test to various fact patterns that have
arisen in the past and to some that may arise in the future.
A. Significant Considerations Arising From Hillsboro and Bliss
Before applications of the new test to both present and future
situations are made, it is necessary to take note of some of the fac-
tors that may be considered by a court mandated to follow the fun-
damentally inconsistent events test.
Obviously, examinations of pertinent legislative history will play
an important role in the future of the tax benefit rule. Whether
these inquiries will be fruitful or theoretically necessary is question-
able. One suspects that in many cases (like Hillsboro) the legislative
history can be read either for or against invoking the tax benefit
rule. Therefore, it will be necessary for courts to look to other per-
suasive factors. The Hillsboro and Bliss fact patterns are a good
starting point because the tax benefit rule was not applied in Hills-
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
117. See, eg., Comment, supra note 2, at 1271-73 (arguing that "it is not at all clear that
the distribution in a liquidation is akin to personal consumption"). Id. at 1271.
118. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
119. The other two cases are Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), and Nash v.
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
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boro, while it was applied in Bliss. An examination of other signifi-
cant differences between those two cases may be helpful.' 20
At least two distinguishing factors between the Hillsboro and
Bliss cases may account for their different outcomes. First, at the
time invocation of the tax benefit rule was sought, the Dairy pos-
sessed an asset, the cattle feed, which under tax law no longer ex-
isted because it was expensed when purchased. On the other hand,
the Bank possessed no such asset.121 Second, the Dairy had de-
ducted the cattle feed under the broad provisions of section 162 as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Bank, however,
deducted its payments to the state under section 164, a much more
specific provision designed to govern a particular set of facts.' 22
The former distinction suggests that the fundamentally inconsis-
tent events test is not as far removed from the recovery analysis as
the antagonistic opinions of Justices O'Connor and Stevens might
suggest.1 23  This distinction is also in concert with Justice
O'Connor's desire to create a new test that is broader than recovery
analysis but narrow enough to exclude many merely inconsistent
events. This distinction also coincides with Justice O'Connor's no-
tion that the tax benefit rule should not be limited to taxing current
wealth-enhancing events but should tax income based on transac-
tional accounting. As applied to the Dairy, then, transactional ac-
counting, measuring income at the close of all transactions, would
have permitted the Dairy to expense only the feed it actually con-
sumed. Application of the tax benefit rule, in this instance, goes
beyond making the Dairy pay tax on recovery of an expense, by
requiring it to recognize income to the extent that it had never actu-
ally incurred the expense involved. 24 In this way, the tax benefit
120. It is important to remember that Justice O'Connor sought to formulate a test for the
application of the tax benefit rule which was broader than recovery analysis but narrower
than the inconsistent events test of Tennessee-Carolina. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 382-83. See
supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's test taxes in-
come based on transactional accounting and does not look for current wealth-enhancing
events to invoke the rule. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381. With Justice O'Connor's framework in
mind, a comparative examination of the two fact patterns is in order.
121. The shareholders possessed and had complete control over the refunds in Hillsboro.
460 U.S. at 373. Cf First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F.2d
1142 (7th Cir. 1980) (where refund checks were made payable jointly to bank and
shareholders).
122. See supra note 78.
123. Both theories would seem to require possession of some asset for the tax benefit rule
to apply.
124. One commentator argues that the essence of the tax benefit rule is that it recognizes
untaxed income from an earlier year. What is needed in the current year is only a reconcilia-
tion event, not a realization event. White, supra note 45, at 504-05.
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rule reconciles the results under annual accounting to those under
transactional accounting, which was Justice O'Connor's goal.
The second distinction, namely the difference in specificity of
the statutes on which the Hillsboro and Bliss deductions were based,
may be more helpful to identify when a court can narrowly define
the premise for a deduction than to identify when to apply the tax
benefit rule. In and of itself, the specificity by which a statute de-
fines a deduction should have no bearing on the applicability of the
tax benefit rule. But Hillsboro provides a good example of how a
court can interpret a specific statute to deny applicability of the tax
benefit rule to fact patterns in which the taxpayer has not recovered
or retained in its possession any of the previous deduction.
Where a Code provision, like section 164(e), sets out a specific
fact pattern in which a deduction is permitted, then the court has an
opportunity to construe the statute as providing relief to the tax-
payer upon payment of the item without regard to the ultimate dis-
position of the money. It is not suggested that every specific Code
provision can or should be interpreted in this way. It is suggested,
however, that certain Code sections lend themselves to this kind of
analysis. The common thread among these provisions is that they
seek to promote some kind of activity-for example, the deductions
for charitable contributions"2 5 and research and experimental ex-
penditures. 126 In contrast, other provisions of the Code seek to de-
termine true income,127 as in the provision for the deductions for
bad debts. 1
2 8
Distinguishing between Code provisions that allow a deduction
to promote a certain activity and those that allow a deduction in
order to measure true income is appropriate within Justice
O'Connor's framework. Since Justice O'Connor's purpose was to
approximate the results of transactional accounting, it follows that
her test should be more limited, i.e., the tax benefit rule should ap-
ply less often, in cases where the deduction involved is not itself
concerned with the measurement of income. Therefore, in cases
concerning deductions that promote congressional policies, only di-
rect recovery, such as the refund to the Bank (as opposed to the
shareholders under the Hillsboro facts), should trigger the tax bene-
fit rule.
125. I.R.C. § 170 (1954).
126. I.R.C. § 174 (1954).
127. True income is defined for these purposes as revenues less the costs of producing
that revenue.
128. I.R.C. § 166 (1954).
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B. Application of the Fundamentally Inconsistent Events Test to
Other Fact Patterns
At this point it is appropriate to take the analysis from the Hills-
boro and Bliss cases and apply it to other fact patterns that may
arise in the future. The first situation raises the issue of whether
recovery analysis retains any relevancy with respect to the tax bene-
fit rule. The second raises the issue of how the test can be suffi-
ciently narrowed in order to apply it in the future.
1. Recoupment of Research and Experimentation Expenses
The following fact pattern is posed in a post-Hillsboro Revenue
Ruling 29 promulgated by the IRS. The fact pattern is instructive
because it includes elements of recovery analysis. The facts state
that the taxpayer's principal business is the manufacture and sale of
consumer products. For many years the taxpayer has engaged in
substantial research leading to the development of patented and un-
patented technology. The taxpayer has properly deducted all re-
search expenses under section 174(a) of the Code and derived a tax
benefit for the entire amount.130 In the current year, the taxpayer
decides to drop a product line and so sells certain patented and un-
patented technology that had been obtained through the previous
expenses.' 3' This situation poses the problem of whether facts
which clearly indicate that a recovery has occurred can nonetheless
fail to be fundamentally inconsistent. 32 The Revenue Ruling an-
swers that question affirmatively. 133
In interpreting the fundamentally inconsistent events test, the
IRS gave far too much deference to the fulfillment of what it saw as
the legislative purpose behind section 174 and not enough deference
to the purpose of the tax benefit rule. The IRS stated that section
174 had two purposes: (1) to encourage research activities, and (2)
to eliminate uncertainty as to the tax treatment of such expendi-
tures.' 34 The IRS then stated that the legislative purposes were
129. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84.
130. It is important to note that in this situation the exact amount of research and devel-
opment expenses devoted to any particular product line cannot be determined.
131. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84.
132. In a pre-Hillsboro Revenue Ruling under similar facts, the IRS stated that the recov-
ery invoked the tax benefit rule. Rev. Rul. 72-528, 1972-2 C.B. 481 (overruled by Rev. Rul.
85-186).
133. The ultimate difference to the taxpayer is that the sale can be treated as the sale of a
capital asset with a zero basis as opposed to a recoupment of ordinary income under the tax
benefit rule.
134. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84.
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served in the year of deduction and as such the subsequent sale had
"independent significance and was not fundamentally inconsis-
tent." 1
35
The Ruling indicates the problem with the new test-it is itself
subject to too much interpretation. By concentrating on one aspect
of the new rule (the legislative purpose behind the specific statute
granting a deduction), 136 the IRS completely ignores the rationales
behind the tax benefit rule itself. If, as the Ruling implies, the tax
benefit rule will not apply when the legislative purposes behind the
initial deduction are achieved in the year of deduction, then the rule
can never be applied. In all tax benefit cases the initial deduction is
a proper one and one that supports the legislative purpose behind
the rule.
A proper application of the fundamentally inconsistent events
test would require application of the tax benefit rule under these
facts. Justice O'Connor's purpose in drafting the new rule was to
broaden its application, not narrow it. In this case, the fundamen-
tally inconsistent event is that after all relevant transactions have
been completed, the taxpayer did not actually spend the money it
claimed as a research and experimentation deduction. There can be
no more inconsistent event than a recovery of the expense. This
outcome is entirely in accord with the purpose of the fundamentally
inconsistent events test- namely, to achieve the results that would
be achieved under transactional rather than annual accounting.
The inquiry into legislative history should be secondary to the goal
of attaining a transactional accounting result. Only in fact patterns
like Hillsboro, where there was no actual recovery, is it proper to
look to legislative history to determine the issue of fundamental
inconsistency.
2. Expenses that Increase Going-Concern Value Without Creating
an Asset
Justice Stevens recognizes a potential problem with the funda-
mentally inconsistent events test by pointing out that the new test,
as stated, would require application of the tax benefit in a broad
range of cases where it has never applied before. The common
thread among these cases is that the expense incurred and deducted
increased the going-concern value of the business without creating a
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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tangible asset.' 37
Taking one of Stevens' examples, assume the facts of Bliss with
one addition. The corporation had engaged in an advertising cam-
paign in the year just prior to liquidation. This campaign was to
benefit the corporation in the following year, but the corporation
was liquidated. Does the fundamentally inconsistent events test re-
quire the corporation to recognize income to the extent that it still
retains the future benefits of the advertising expenses?
The issue arises because it seems that the taxpayer is still in pos-
session of some asset, albeit intangible, at the time of liquidation,
much like the cattle feed in Bliss. However, upon closer examina-
tion an important difference can be seen. With respect to the cattle
feed, the Dairy had never spent the money in the manner the statute
contemplates. 138  In the case of advertising,1 39 the taxpayer has
spent the money in accordance with the requirements of the deduc-
tion. Nothing has happened to subvert the premise of the deduc-
tion, i.e., that the taxpayer has spent money to promote the
business. The fact that the business is now worth more because of
the advertising is not at all inconsistent with the taking of a deduc-
tion. Indeed, many deductible expenses are incurred for that very
reason. 140
The fundamentally inconsistent events test can and should be
137. "It is not clear, however, how the Court would react to other expenses that provide
an enduring benefit. I find no limiting principle in the Court's opinion that distinguishes
cattle feed . . . from prepaid rent, prepaid insurance, accruals of employee vacation time,
advertising, management training, or any other expense that will have made the going con-
cern more valuable .. " Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 419.
138. The deduction of cattle feed as an ordinary and necessary business expense of a dairy
clearly contemplates the consumption of the feed. White, supra note 45, at 503. The fact that
the feed is deductible in the period bought as opposed to the period consumed is merely a
matter of ease of administration.
139. Note that advertising expenses are currently deductible under § 162 of the Code as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (West Supp. 1986).
140. An argument can be made that the goodwill associated with the advertising expenses
can be distributed if, after liquidation, the business is continued in non-corporate form. This
would seem to equate the "unconsumed" advertising with the unconsumed cattle feed dis-
cussed above, therefore calling for application of the tax benefit rule.
The critical point is, however, that the advertising expenses have been incurred consistent
with the premise for their deductibility, i.e., it is a deductible business expense to promote a
business by advertising. It is irrelevant to the question of deductibility whether the advertis-
ing expenses will benefit future periods. Therefore, distribution of the goodwill generated by
the advertising should not invoke the tax benefit rule. See White, supra note 45, at 503-04.
To draw an analogy to the cattle feed situation, if the feed had been consumed, then the
premise of the deductibility of the feed would have been upheld. Therefore, any future distri-
bution of the benefits of incurring the expense, i.e., the benefits of fatter, healthier cattle,
should also not invoke the tax benefit rule.
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interpreted to reach this result. The basic premise of ordinary and
necessary business expenses should be construed as the incurring of
the expense to create revenues. In the cattle feed case, the taxpayer
has an asset it could turn around and sell. Thus, the Dairy has not
incurred the expense with finality."' In the advertising case, the
taxpayer has finally incurred the expense in question.
Construing the basic premise test narrowly, as this example sug-
gests, supports Justice O'Connor's goal of defining "fundamentally
inconsistent" more narrowly than merely "inconsistent.""'4 It also
supports the goal of promoting transactional accounting because at
the end of all the transactions in question, the taxpayer is still in the
position of having spent money in the manner contemplated by the
deduction. 143
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's formulation of the fundamentally incon-
sistent events test in Hillsboro invites some controversy because of
the broad language used by the majority. Therefore, taxpayers, tax
planners, and tax collectors will need to analyze the cases closely to
apply the test consistently in the future. While the test should be
construed more broadly than a recovery theory, it must retain some
features of the recovery analysis. Furthermore, the premises on
which deductions are based should be construed narrowly, with the
key inquiry being whether the taxpayer has actually spent the funds
in accordance with the statute. In this way, the rule can stay within
the framework of the new test while becoming sufficiently narrow
for future application.
THOMAS J. MAHONEY, JR.
141. See White, supra note 45, at 502. White notes that finality is a key concept in apply-
ing the tax benefit rule appropriately. Finality is also important in Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion since transactional accounting is a goal of the new test.
142. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
143. This fact is only known, however, once the basic premise of the deduction is defined
as having spent the money in question in promotion of some congressional policy; e.g., chari-
table deductions, or in an effort to increase net income; e.g., ordinary and necessary business
expenses.
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